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Thus, that you may practice charity in action and in will, I in my providence did not 
give to any one person or to each individually the knowledge for doing everything 
necessary for human life. No, I gave something to one, something else to another, so 
that each one’s need would be a reason to have recourse to the other. (…) Could I not 
have given everyone everything? Of course. But in my providence I wanted to make 
each of you dependent on the others, so that you would be forced to exercise charity 
in action and will at once.  
 
Catherine of Siena (1980) The dialogue. Londen: Paulist Press. pp. 311-312. 
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1. Introduction: The changing role of citizens in welfare and care 
Ever since its foundation the welfare state in Western societies has searched for a 
healthy balance between the role of the state and of citizens. Changing views of 
governments and changes in demographic structures compel welfare states to review 
the position of the state and of citizens constantly. In the last decades, the ageing of 
the population, the coexistence of different cultures and the increasing work 
participation of women made changes in the welfare state necessary, because 
arrangements in the welfare state were not suitable to the present demands of citizens 
(Tonkens et al., 2008: 11). At the same time, Dutch government changed its view on 
citizenship. Since a few years, the dominant ideal of citizenship has been centered on 
self-reliance, mutual care, spontaneous self-development and responsibility. The state 
should be ‘inviting’ and ‘connecting’ to citizens, and not ‘caring’ and ‘assuring’, as 
was more common in earlier decades. In this way, more responsibility and initiative is 
asked from citizens (Tonkens, 2009: 15).  
The welfare state is, as a result of those developments, changing towards a 
system in which a larger role is played by citizens. When a relatively large part of the 
population is retired, the costs of welfare for the active population will increase. The 
interpretation of citizenship as self-reliance and individual responsibility shows that 
input from citizens themselves is expected in the system of welfare and gives the 
opportunity to decrease the input from the state, by lower tax rates for example. This 
changing role of citizens is also visible in the introduction of the Societal Support Act 
(Wmo) in the Netherlands. This act shows that the accent of welfare has shifted from 
‘care in an organization’ to ‘support in society’ (Tonkens, 2009: 99). This means that 
the welfare system aims towards participation of everyone in society, whether healthy 
or unhealthy, which is partly done by caring for people in society prominently instead 
of in hidden away. The Social Support Act is seen by some as a transition from the 
welfare state to a ‘participation society’. It is not the state that should provide welfare 
for everyone, but the effort of citizens that should make welfare possible (Van 
Doorne-Huiskes et al., 2008: 7, 8).  
Concentrating on one part of the welfare state, the part of care, the larger role 
of citizens is visible in changes in the assigned roles of formal and informal care. The 
role of informal care, which is care from family, friends, neighbors, or volunteers, is 
becoming larger (Tonkens et al., 2008: 11). In this way, citizens are becoming co-
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executives of government policy (Hortulanus, 2002: 16). The policy of governments 
is that everyone should receive care if someone needs it, but governments cannot 
supply this amount and level of care on their own. The effort of citizens is needed to 
care for all who need it. Besides, governments not only want the contribution of 
citizens because of their own inability to provide for care of all citizens, but also 
because of the integrating and cohesive function that participation is thought to have 
(Van Doorne-Huiskes et al., 2008: 12). A more substantial role for informal care is a 
consequence of and answer to the limitations of formal care and the benefits of 
informal care.  
 These developments show that the appeal to citizens in the welfare state and 
especially in relation to care has changed. Unhealthy citizens are dependent on 
informal care to a larger extent than before. Besides, caring for fellow citizens is 
considered as a necessary part of one’s citizenship. This gives a new dimension to the 
role of citizens in the welfare state. Instead of an emphasis on the rights to welfare, it 
is stressed that citizens have a duty to care for their fellow citizens. To take care of 
people around you is in itself not an extraordinary thing to do. A loving or intimate 
relation between two people creates the willingness to take care of each other and a 
feeling of responsibility for the welfare of one another (De Boer, 2007: 19, 20). 
People would be displeased if they would not be allowed to care for the ones they 
love. But this does not mean that it can be expected that you take care of your family. 
It is not at all clear what the state may expect from family in relation to care. Apart 
from intimate relationships between family members or friends, most citizens are 
merely related to each other as citizens. What role do citizens have towards other 
citizens in the context of care?  
The research question of this thesis is: What should the state expect from 
citizens and what should be the role of the state in the context of care? To answer this 
research question, it is necessary to explain which vision on state intervention and the 
role of the state in the context of care I believe is appropriate. This will be done in the 
second chapter. This vision will give general guidelines for the extent to which the 
state is allowed to interfere in civil society and the private sphere. The vision of state 
interference I will defend views the micro level as guiding for what the state, on 
macro level, is allowed to do. Therefore it is important to focus on this micro level: 
citizens and their mutual relations, which I will do in chapter three. Before I will look 
at the interpretation of citizenship in the fifth chapter, I will explore the role of 
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autonomy in the relations between citizens in chapter four. This is important, because 
the autonomy of citizens may easily be threatened  with regard to care, dependency, 
and state intervention. In the fifth chapter, as said, I will look at the consequences of 
the vision on the state for a vision on citizenship and state intervention. In the sixth 
chapter a more concrete content can be given to the role of the state, as supplement of 
citizens’ actions.  
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2. A vision on state intervention 
This thesis explores the role of the state and of citizens in the context of care. A 
multitude of divisions of tasks between state and citizens is possible, which all depend 
on and are influenced by the vision one has on a proper role of the state and its 
citizens. In this chapter I will argue for a vision on state interference in which citizens 
have a leading role. After I have made clear which balance between state and citizens 
should be found in the context of care, a solid basis is made to think about the ways 
citizens are connected and should fulfill their role as citizen. In this chapter I will 
explain which models for state intervention can be chosen, and which one I will 
choose in this thesis. 
 
§2.1: Three models of state intervention 
A first way to look at the state is one in which negative rights are emphasized. 
Negative rights are rights on non-interference and focus primarily on the fact that the 
state should abstain from action to respect the rights of citizens (Wenar, 2011: section 
2.1.8). In the context of care, this emphasis on negative rights is not suitable, because 
care in itself is not a right that is respected when the state withdraws, but can instead 
be interpreted as a right that is respected when the state provides a certain service. A 
second way therefore to look at the state is one in which positive rights are stressed. 
Positive rights are rights on some good or service (Wenar, 2011: section 2.1.8). In the 
context of care this means that care is seen as a good or service that citizens are 
entitled to. The state then has the role to provide this good to its citizens and is 
allowed to interfere in citizens’ lives to give them their rights. 
 The way I would like to look at the role of the state is one in which citizens 
and their duties are central to the division between state and citizens. The most 
important guideline for the state is the primacy of citizens and their duties, instead of 
an emphasis on rights, whether positive or negative. This does not mean that care 
cannot be interpreted as a right in this model, but when discussed with regard to state 
intervention and citizens the focus is first of all directed at the duties that citizens 
have. Duties can be seen as logically correlative with rights: when someone has a 
right, an accompanying duty shows what others should do to ensure that right 
(Simmons, 1979: 14). With an emphasis on duties I do not deny a right to care, but in 
the context of state and citizenship I choose to give primacy to the side of duties. The 
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first role of the state, then, is one of asking its citizens: ‘What are your duties in the 
context of care?’. The state has the role of making its citizens aware of their duties in 
the context of care. This is an important role, but not the only one. In this model, the 
state will interfere in civil society and the private sphere, to guarantee that care is 
provided for all citizens. In this way a right to care, which in this thesis I assume 
exists, is not neglected. This interference does not take place before citizens are aware 
of their duties. When citizens are made aware of their duties and hopefully have 
fulfilled them, it is possible that care is still not given to everyone who needs it. At 
that moment the state will intervene in civil society and the private sphere to make 
sure everyone in need receives care. The interfering role of the state, then, 
encompasses a safety net for when citizens and their duties fall short. The best ways 
in which the state can provide such a safety net will be discussed in the sixth chapter. 
 This last model for state intervention does not focus on what the state should 
or should not do, but on what citizens should or should not do. I choose to use this 
vision on state interference because, as will become clear in the next chapter, we are 
all affected by care. Everyone needs care in their lives, and this makes it not merely a 
service of the state to its citizens, but something in which every citizen is involved. In 
section 6.1 I will give a more complete justification for choosing this model, when 
more is clear on the character of care and caring relations. The micro level, namely 
care on the level of every individual citizen, then is guiding for the role of the state on 
macro level. Thus, the focus of this thesis is on this micro-level, which will give 
direction for the ways the state is allowed to interfere in civil society and the private 
sphere.  
 
§2.2: First exploration of the consequences on citizenship 
This particular vision on state intervention has consequences for the way citizenship 
should be regarded. What has become clear from this third model is the emphasis on 
citizens’ duties. In the first and second model, citizens’ primary focus is on their 
entitlement to care, but in the third model, this focus shifts towards the duties to care 
they need to fulfill. In the fifth chapter I will argue how being a citizen may create 
duties, but now a preliminary exploration of the concepts of citizens and citizenship 
can be made. In this thesis I will interpret citizens as members of a state, who are 
consequently related to other members of that state, their fellow citizens. As citizens, 
people are connected to people with whom they otherwise would not have been 
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connected. The vision on state intervention I will use in this thesis views the social 
responsibility of citizens to take care of one another as the core business of 
citizenship. This social interpretation of citizenship however is based on political and 
personal relations in the context of care. This classification will become clear in 
section 5.3. Since the state does not regard its own role in the first place as ensuring  
rights to care, the state gives citizens the first responsibility to care for each other. In 
the next chapters we will see what the content of this responsibility is and what it is 
based on. 
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3. Relations between citizens 
Because the basic thought of state intervention in this thesis is that the micro level, 
individual citizens, determines what should happen on the macro level, the state, this 
chapter will focus on that micro level. It is necessary to view it from this angle, 
because when it is clear how citizens live together in the context of care, it is possible 
to make an argument for the degree and the content of the duties that citizens may be 
asked to fulfill. 
Wherever and whenever people live together in societies, relations between 
those people are extending beyond the bonds people naturally have. Apart from 
family relations, people interact with others in the same society and are connected 
with others whom they would never have met if they had not lived in the same society 
and shared in the same institutions. In this chapter I will explore all those different 
relations that people may have in a society. I will concentrate on caring relations in 
one country, to limit the scope of this research on caring duties of fellow citizens. 
Moreover, in western societies care and welfare arrangements are still organized at 
the national level and not the sub- or supra-national level, despite ongoing changes. 
Therefore, in searching for a right interpretation of caring relations of citizens, the 
scope of one country is suitable.  
 I will start this chapter with a definition of care that I will use in this thesis. 
Then I will state and prove that people are mutually dependent on each other in the 
context of care. To clarify these dependence relations I will elaborate on four kinds of 
relationships of care and the ways in which people are dependent in those relations. 
 
§3.1: Defining care 
In caring activities, the well-being of the other is central to the person who cares. 
Contrary to most activities, like working or relaxing, in caring behavior  the other’s 
needs are a starting point for what must be done, as Sara Ruddick states (Tronto, 
1993: 105). Caring is furthermore related to the basic needs of persons. In friendships, 
friends find the well-being of each other also very important, but in general, their 
relation cannot be defined as caring. In a caring relation, the development and basic 
biological and social well-being or needs are the direct end of that relation (Engster, 
2005: 51). The relation between people exists because of meeting the needs of the 
other, and not because of, for example, mutual pleasure. This does not mean that 
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caring people will never get any satisfaction or pleasure out of their caring activities, 
but this is certainly not the aim of this relation.  
 Care is primarily an activity, a practice, and not an attitude or virtue. However, 
care is often related to or even identified with virtuous behavior. Care ethicists do not 
explicitly define care as a virtue, but they definitely see care as closely related to 
virtues and morality (Tronto, 1993: 57). Care cannot be separated from and practiced 
without virtues, according to a care ethicist like Joan Tronto. She states that a ‘habit 
of mind’ is needed to care in a morally correct way (1993: 127). Besides, she claims 
that care is both a practice and a disposition (1993: 104). However, I would like to 
state that care is primarily a practice, sometimes accompanied with a disposition. I do 
not think that care is always both practice and disposition. Although care can be a 
private, emotional or sensitive activity, in my opinion virtues are not by definition 
necessary to care for others. What should be central to practices of care are the needs 
of others and the fulfillment of those needs. By linking care directly to an inner 
disposition, I believe the practice of care is falsely limited to a private, personal and 
subjective activity. I would like to state that care can exist and can be good when 
someone lacks an inner conviction or attitude that would place the one in need at the 
centre. In the remainder of this chapter it will become clearer what can be seen as 
care.  
 
§3.2: Dependency of citizens 
Although the concepts of care and dependency are often used in different discourses, 
they can be seen as inseparable (Fine and Glendinning, 2005: 607-608). The concept 
of care has a positive connotation, but that of dependency is in general not seen as a 
positive state of being. Most of the public policies are directed at the reduction of the 
dependent status of people. Perhaps only in the private sphere dependency is seen as a 
neutral status, because in the private sphere the acknowledgment exists that 
dependency brings people together (2005: 604-607). In the public sphere, this positive 
notion is apparently lacking, because of the effort to reduce dependency as much as 
possible. Different types of dependency can be distinguished, as can be seen in public 
policies and discourse: economic, socio-legal, political, moral/psychological, 
physical, and structural dependency are a few of the most important ones (2005: 606).  
 I would like to argue that in the context of care everyone depends on each 
other. People may depend on each other in different ways, but I think it can be 
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rightfully stated that everyone needs the help of others in some way and at some point 
in their lives to fulfill their needs and promote their well-being. In his book 
Dependent Rational Animals Alisdair MacIntyre proposes to see each one of us, to 
some extent, as disabled (MacIntyre, 1999: 73). In different periods of our lives we 
are to different degrees disabled and dependent on the care of others. To be disabled 
means to be limited in the possibilities we have. We cannot by ourselves remove 
obstacles that limit us, we need others to do that to us and in that way enlarge our 
possibilities (1999: 73-75). Everyone is dependent from parents or other care takers in 
their infancy. In our infancy, we have to depend on others for our own well-being. As 
we grow old, we will be dependent on others for our well-being and survival as well. 
In other periods of our lives we may also be limited in our possibilities, each to a 
different extent. MacIntyre states that especially in the periods that our possibilities 
change and we become more or in different ways dependent, we need other people to 
affirm that we continue to be the same person, in spite of our changing possibilities 
(1999: 73).  
Although MacIntyre is assuming quite radically that all are dependent and 
disabled, he is not completely comfortable with this idea. On the contrary, the better 
part of his book is devoted to the search for a way out of the dependent status of 
humans beings. He acknowledges that we are dependent rational animals by nature, 
but that we have the desire to become independent. The transition from dependence to 
independence is to be found in the development of virtues, according to MacIntyre 
(MacIntyre, 1999: 5-6). However, the necessary virtues for this transition we cannot 
develop ourselves. Instead, we should acknowledge that we need others and that our 
desires are focused on everyone who can satisfy our needs (1999: 83). To admit our 
failure in independency thus is the first step in the direction of independency. Without 
the knowledge of the limits of our possibilities, we will never be able to break free 
from these limits, which are our dependencies, attachments and conflicts. Only when 
we can acknowledge in what ways we are dependent, we will not be captivated by 
these limitations and attachments (1999: 85). 
 This notion of dependency shows that people, apart from being citizens, have a 
personal, private relation that is characterized by dependency with people whom they 
are intimate with. Apart from this notion, citizens are as citizens dependent on each 
other in a more structural way and on a larger scale. In Western societies, care has 
been positioned in a welfare system in which working people contribute to the costs 
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for people who need care at that moment. Citizens need their fellow citizens to 
contribute to such a welfare system, to maintain this system. When each of the other 
citizens refuses to contribute, a welfare system will collapse and no one will receive 
the benefits of it. Citizens are therefore dependent on their fellow citizens to maintain 
a welfare system and receive their own share when they need care. Such a welfare 
system closely links care to dependency. One could even state that such a welfare 
system creates dependency. Such a dependency is, similar to personal dependency, a 
mutual one. One period in your life you will contribute to this welfare system, and 
another period you will receive care made possible by this system. Furthermore, 
citizens may become dependent on each other in civil society. Civil society is the area 
between state and market in which citizens voluntarily interact. Associations, or 
citizens involved in such associations, that are concerned with care may create 
relations of dependency between each other. These dependency relations, however, do 
not always exist: only when citizens, voluntarily, become active in the caring part of 
civil society, relations of dependency are created. 
 So, on the micro level dependency relations exist in the public sphere as well 
as in the private sphere. Individual citizens are involved in dependency relations in the 
roles of contributors in civil society or a welfare system, and in family contexts. 
 
§3.3: Types of care relations 
The different forms of dependency described in the last section reflect the different 
aspects of care that can be distinguished, I believe. Care is not only a matter of giving 
and receiving, but aspects of ‘caring about’ and ‘taking care of’ are also a part of the 
concept of caring (Tronto, 1993: 106). These different accounts of care could be 
viewed as different steps in caring. For a complete understanding of these steps I will 
describe them, show how dependency plays a role, and explain how they are related to 
each other. But beforehand I will give a characterization of different kinds of relations 
citizens have towards each other in the context of care, to portray the complexity of 
these relations.  
Care is traditionally connected to the private sphere, family and households. 
Naturally, parents give care to their children, in a direct sense, and when parents grow 
old, their children care for them. This mutual care relation is not based on reciprocity, 
but is guided by unconditional care (MacIntyre, 1999: 100). The needs of children are 
unconditionally met by their parents, and normally children care for their parents not 
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to the extent that they received care from them, but to the extent the parents are in 
need of care. This, however, is not the complete description of relations between 
parents and children MacIntyre gives. If it were, it would be a far too rosy picture. 
MacIntyre gives a far more realistic account of personal, caring relations when he 
marks that all relations have a double character (1999: 102-103). Relations based on 
sympathy and affections are not only a matter of sympathy and affection. In those 
relations a degree of hierarchy and power is present as well (1999: 116-117). Parents 
use their power in some way over their children and children may care for their 
parents because of some advantage for themselves.  
This double character is also visible in relations that are primarily defined by 
‘rational exchange’. In those relations, aspects of unconditional giving have their 
place as well (MacIntyre, 1999: 117). These, more rational and distant, relations can 
however also be called care relations. Citizens, as citizens, therefore also have care 
relations with each other. These differences and mixtures of rationality and affections 
are visible in the following characterization of care, described in four steps: caring 
about, taking care of, care giving and care receiving. 
Caring about means that someone notices the need to care in the first place 
(Tronto, 1993: 127). Actual needs are not directly met, but this first step is necessary 
to come to fulfillment of needs. Caring about can be done individually, but a social 
policy that pays attention to, for instance, the disabled can be called to care about the 
disabled (1993: 106). Relations that are characterized by ‘caring about’ may exist 
between people who do not know each other but are faced with each other’s needs in 
an indirect way, for example through media or mutual friends. Through stories or 
pictures, awareness may be raised that someone else is in need. When raising 
awareness is the only step of caring, people can be called to care, but the actual 
meeting of needs does not occur. Caring about can exist between people who are far 
away from each other, spatially, temporally and emotionally: people may care about 
children on the other side of the world, from the next generation and with whom they 
do not have a personal relation. The aspect of dependency is not clearly present in 
these kinds of relations. Awareness is needed, and is the first step in a caring 
relationship, but when awareness is all there is, people in this relation are not involved 
with each other in an intensive way. As the first step in a caring relation, this ‘caring 
about’ shows that the needy are dependent on the awareness of the people who are 
their potential care giver. 
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Taking care takes caring one step further, by the acceptance of one’s own 
responsibility to meet the needs of others. If a social policy only writes about the 
needs of the disabled but does not actually meet those needs in some way, it is not 
right to state that such a policy takes care of the disabled (Tronto, 1993: 106-107, 
127). In relations that are marked with characteristics of ‘taking care of’, dependency 
is present in a more direct way. People take responsibility to meet the needs of others, 
by providing the resources for care (1993: 106-107). Examples of such relations are 
giving money or creating groups that coordinate and administer the actual care giving. 
People from such groups are not involved in care giving directly, but they make sure 
that others will give care and other people’s basic needs are met. Because we are 
dealing with the relations citizens have, as citizens, we will not take into account 
formal care organizations, in which care professionals exercise their jobs. Instead, we 
look at organizations of citizens who take care of other citizens. Community centers, 
self-help groups and diaconate from churches are examples of citizens who take care 
of other citizens. People involved in this kind of care are dependent on the resources 
others are willing to spend on them. People in need are dependent on people who take 
care in a structural way. Providing resources to care can be done in formal and 
informal groups and organizations, but taking care mainly takes shape in the public or 
semi-public sphere. Private networks are in general not sufficiently capable to provide 
resources in a structural way (1993: 107). 
 Care giving can be defined as directly meeting others’ needs, and therefore 
relations of care giving exist between people who are somehow directly related 
(Tronto, 1993: 107). Most of the time this means that people know each other prior to 
and apart from the care relation, as family or friends. Relations in which care giving is 
involved are relations between parents and children, (disabled) family members or 
friends. The people involved are dependent on each other in a structural, physical and 
psychological way. In these relations the mutual character of dependency is probably 
clearer than in other relations. Children are dependent on their parents, parents on 
their children and siblings and friends on each other for mutual love and acceptance. 
These relations resonate with the description MacIntyre gives of dependency, which I 
mentioned in the previous section: we all need others to recognize that we are the 
same when the extent to which we depend on others changes. But of course these 
relations can also be asymmetrical: when a husband is severely disabled and his wife 
 17 
cares for him, or when a child has been abused by his parents and nevertheless gives 
care when they need it. 
Care receiving is a response of the one who is cared for and whose needs are 
hopefully met. Care receiving is logically complementary to care giving. When care is 
given, care is automatically received by someone else. In practice, however, care 
giving does not have to mean that the needs of a person are met completely and in the 
right way. It is possible that a person wants to eat on his own, with some assistance 
from someone else, whereas the care giver feeds him, because it is faster and less 
complicated (Tronto, 1993: 108). In a care receiving relation the kinds of dependency 
therefore are the same as in a care giving relation, but extended with the feature that 
the care giver is dependent on the demands and responses of the care receiver to see if 
needs are actually met. 
The degree to which needs are directly met distinguish the four steps of care. 
In the step of caring about, no actual needs are met. In the step of taking care, more 
practical conditions to meet needs are provided for. In the steps of care giving and 
receiving, the activity of care is centered on the direct and actual meeting of needs. 
This order of the different steps of care is also applicable to how close and personal 
the relation is between the caring one and the one in need. We saw that someone can 
care about someone on the other side of the world and that care giving and receiving 
happens in direct and personal relations. Furthermore, I have already described that 
giving and receiving of care are logically complementary. The steps of caring about 
and taking care do not have such a complementary relation with one another.  
 
§3.4: Motivation to care 
When I gave a definition of care in the beginning of this chapter, I emphasized that a 
limitation of care to a mental disposition or the necessity of a mental disposition in 
caring is in my opinion not right. Care may be both practice and disposition, but is 
primarily a practice. This was made clear by the differences in care relations that 
exist. We already have seen that care relations may be characterized by a mixture of 
sympathy, affection, power and hierarchy. Besides, care is not only found in personal 
relations, but also in policies and arrangements. Care relations exist between family 
members, but also between citizens, and may even exist between people who have 
never met each other. In the context of state intervention and citizenship, all those 
dependency and care relations are of importance. The different steps in care that can 
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be distinguished show diverse accounts of what is needed to speak of care. Care is 
primarily a practice, but I would like to argue that in the steps of care giving and 
receiving, when the actual needs are met, a certain disposition is indispensible. This 
will be shown in the remainder of this chapter.  
What, then, can be said about the proper motivation to care? Michael Slote 
interprets motivation as affectionate when he links care closely to empathy. In his 
book The Ethics of Care and Empathy he states that feelings of empathy are a ‘crucial 
source and sustainer of altruistic concern or caring about others’ (Slote, 2007: 15). He 
uses the concept of empathy as the motivation to care, because he thinks empathy is a 
good moral guideline to ethics of care. Slote states that feelings of empathy have a 
good correspondence with intuitive evaluations of the moral side of care (2007: 16). 
The differences in feelings of empathy for people are closely linked to the moral 
evaluations we make. We use these differences in empathy and our reactions to those 
feelings to make moral judgments and understand them. When we feel much empathy 
for someone, we are inclined to help him and evaluate that this is a moral thing to do. 
Apparently, we think that our feelings of empathy can be a moral guideline for our 
caring (2007: 128).  
 I think Slote is right in incorporating empathy in his theory of care. Empathy 
plays an important role in caring relations, because it can create, among others, an 
affectionate motivation to care. But I definitely do not agree with Slote’s statement 
that our feelings of empathy are a good moral guideline for determining in what ways 
we should care for others. I do not believe Slote has convincingly proven the link 
between how we evaluate our caring actions in practice and how and according to 
which standards we should evaluate those actions. I believe it is very likely that our 
empathic feelings are so corrupted that we have too limited, or not the right, feelings 
towards others to make them the only guidelines for our actions. Feelings can be 
manipulated, in such a way that we do not feel related to people to whom we should 
feel related. An extreme example is the manipulation Nazism used to eliminate the 
Jews. By dehumanizing the Jews, other people stopped feeling pity for them, because 
they could not identify with the Jews. 
Furthermore, describing empathy and its moral force as dependent on 
immediacy, in time, place and causality, Slote creates a moral guideline of caring, 
centered around the closeness of the one who needs care to the care giver. In that way 
the possibilities, position and feelings of the person who is not in need have more 
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influence on a moral decision than is appropriate, I believe. If care is about meeting 
the needs of others, I consider it not justified to give subjective, and possibly flawed, 
judgments and feelings of the care giver such a central position.  
When care is interpreted as broad as I did, feelings of empathy are not a 
necessary basis for a motivation to care. When care is taken place in personal and 
direct relations, I think a kind of mental disposition, or some virtuous attitude, that 
accompanies the practice of care is indispensible. When care takes place in less direct 
relations, in arrangements or the giving of money, I do not think a mental disposition 
is necessary to provide care. In care giving and receiving, however, people need a 
certain mental disposition to give and receive care properly.  
Daniel Engster discusses the relevance of the virtues of attentiveness, 
responsiveness and respect in the context of care (2005: 54). Attentiveness can be 
defined as sensitivity to the needs of others, the ability to notice if someone is in need 
of care. Engster links this virtue also to empathy. Responsiveness points to the quality 
of engaging in the exact nature of the needs people have and the ability to monitor the 
reactions to given care. Respect is needed for the notion that others with certain needs 
are of as much worth as others with lesser needs (2005: 54, 55). To care regularly and 
so that the aim of caring is achieved, virtues of caring are necessary (2005: 54). It may 
be possible to give care for a person once without the right sensitivity, for instance by 
washing someone, but when you genuinely and directly want to meet the needs of 
someone, you need to listen to their needs and their reactions. Otherwise you may 
have a wrong view of the needs of a person, and you will not care effectively and 
properly. Furthermore, without the attitude that someone is as much of worth as you, 
you may lose sight of the necessity of your caring.  
I have shown that citizens all have dependency relations with their fellow 
citizens, but direct and personal ones only with family and friends. The actual care 
giving and receiving will mainly take place in the contexts of family and friends. The 
virtues of care are more likely to be present in such personal relations, because caring 
relations then are based on pre-existing ties of family or friendship. In less direct and 
personal relations those virtues will not be completely present. Yet, since in those 
relations care giving and receiving does not take place, this is not a problem. The 
main significance of virtues of care is not that it is an instruction to develop those 
virtues to care properly. Instead, the necessity of virtues of care in the direct meeting 
of needs is primarily a sign and guideline to clarify in what kind of relations direct 
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care has a place. Besides, the observation that for care giving and receiving virtues are 
indispensible does not mean that the motivation to give or receive care should be 
based on feelings. Virtues in care mean that care is given or received with a certain 
attitude. The development of or an appeal to these virtues can, and should, be done on 
rational grounds. In chapter five I will discuss whether people should give direct care 
to people other than family members or friends, and whether they should develop the 
virtues of care.  
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4. Autonomy and dependency 
The account of care between fellow citizens so far given stresses the centrality of 
dependency of every citizen. It was stated that every citizen is dependent on his 
fellow citizens in some way and care should adapt to this fact. Before we turn to the 
consequences for citizenship and its duties in the next chapter, it is necessary to take a 
step back and evaluate the goals of care and examine whether those goals create 
tension with the character of human relations as described in the previous chapter. 
 The fulfillment of the basic needs of others is central to care, as I described in 
the previous chapter. Most of the time, the underlying motive of fulfilling those needs 
is concerned with the autonomy of an individual. People may be dependent and care 
should be given so that those people will become independent and autonomous (Fine 
and Glendinning, 2005: 602). At least, in those terms care and welfare are discussed 
in liberal discourse (2005: 613). Autonomy and independence are the aim of care in 
this discourse. The fact that all people are dependent, in different degrees and in their 
whole lives, seems to be incompatible with this aim of independence. It seems that the 
goal of autonomy and independency can never, or only for a while, be reached. In this 
chapter I will search for a decrease in the tension between autonomy and dependency 
by discussing different interpretations of autonomy, the relation with inequality and 
power, and the application of autonomy in the different steps of care.  
 
§4.1: Defining autonomy 
The terms ‘autonomy’ and ‘independence’ do not mean the same. The fact that people 
cannot be independent in care relations, as I explained in the previous chapter, 
therefore does not mean that people cannot be autonomous in care relations. 
Furthermore, I believe that the aim of care is autonomy, and not independence. A 
general definition of autonomy is the moral capacity to make one’s own decisions, to 
govern oneself (Christman, 2011: §1.2). To make this concept more concrete in the 
context of care, attention has to be paid to the meaning of this concept for different 
parties involved in caring. Autonomy in care is guaranteed when all parties involved 
have the moral capacity to make one’s own decisions. However, this is an ideal 
situation, and especially in caring often not (completely) attainable. A person who is 
dying does not have any capacity to decide anything at all. Aiming for autonomy then 
makes no sense anymore. Furthermore, when care is accompanied by a duty, as I will 
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argue in this thesis, it may be argued that such duty diminishes one’s own freedom to 
make decisions. Because of these limitations and difficulties I think it is appropriate to 
state that autonomy is still the ultimate goal of care, but that sometimes it is simply 
not attainable. In those situations the new goal then should be to try to attain 
autonomy as much as possible.  
 MacIntyre makes a similar argument. Instead of autonomy he speaks of 
independence as an ultimate goal to aim for (MacIntyre, 1999: 5). He adheres to a 
paradoxical point of view, because he states that independence can only be reached by 
acknowledging dependency (1999: 85). He strives for distancing from one’s own 
desires and the cultivation of virtues to become independent rational animals as much 
as possible (1999: 5, 73). In this way, MacIntyre permits the continuance of the 
contradiction between dependence and independence. By holding on to the aim of 
independency and at the same time acknowledging that this can only be reached by 
dependency, MacIntyre tries to unite those two.  
In the context of care, I believe it is better to speak of autonomy instead of 
independence, as MacIntyre does. Independence in the context of care would mean 
that someone in need does not need others to fulfill those needs. In the previous 
chapter I argued that with regard to care everyone is at some point in life dependent 
on others. Dependency is a human condition in the context of care. Independency is 
not possible and furthermore not a favorable condition. I do not believe that being 
capable of fulfilling all your needs by yourself is by definition a better position than 
receiving some help or assistance from others. Moreover, aiming for independency 
can easily result in an emphasis on non-interference (Slote, 2007: 69). Such an 
emphasis on non-interference places people in a discourse in which the assistance of 
others is seen as an intervention in the personal sphere, instead of a helping hand. So, 
the concept of autonomy, to be in charge of one’s own life as much as possible, is a 
more appropriate concept in this context. It shows that care is not directed at doing 
everything on your own, which can be called executional autonomy, but on decisional 
autonomy. A person in this way is autonomous when he can exercise control over the 
help and care he is given, even though he cannot execute this help and care himself 
(Fine and Glendinning, 2005: 610).  
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§4.2: Inequality 
Interpreting autonomy this particular way, and holding on to the characterization of 
human nature as dependent, results in the acknowledgment that citizens find 
themselves in unequal positions to each other when in one situation one citizen is 
more dependent on the other, and in another situation this is reversed. This inequality 
is an inequality of possibilities. People who are in need have lesser possibilities than 
other people, and are dependent on others to compensate for the lack of possibilities 
they have. This dependent situation means that you are in a vulnerable position 
towards the other. But a similar vulnerable position is present when you are the one 
who cares for someone who is dependent on you. Vulnerability ends the assumption 
that all citizens are in an equal and autonomous position all the time (Tronto, 1993: 
135). Vulnerability means sensitivity to the actions of others. The more inequality and 
dependency there is between people, the more people are sensitive to the actions of 
others. When one is receiving care, one is vulnerable to the actions of the care giver: 
because he cannot care for himself, his well-being is in the hands of the care giver. 
But this vulnerability is equally true in a reversed situation: when one is giving care, 
one has to listen and obey to the care receiver.  
An inequality of possibilities thus is accompanied with vulnerability. This 
vulnerability in turn results often in an inequality in terms of power. Eva Kittay even 
states that every dependent relation is characterized by inequality of power (Fine and 
Glendinning, 2005: 613). Care relations are ‘framed by power’ and domination of one 
party over another can easily be exercised (2005: 616, 613). Tronto notices that on the 
one hand the unequal position that clearly exists between care giver and receiver may 
result in paternalism, when some decisions are made by the care giver while the care 
receiver can do this by himself. On the other hand, the needs of some people are more 
completely met than others, and these differences mainly follow differences in power 
in society (Tronto, 1993: 145-146). In the next section these difficulties concerning 
autonomy, dependency and power are explored for the different steps in care. 
 
§4.3: Autonomy in different steps of care 
The first step in care was described as caring about. When people care about others, 
the involvement is mainly an awareness. Because relations of this kind do not have 
much substance, dependency does not play an important role. People who are in need 
can be called to be dependent on the others’ awareness to their needs. It certainly is 
 24 
possible to stimulate and cultivate certain feelings and raise awareness, but this 
clearly does not have to diminish autonomy. To raise awareness the attention of 
people should be directed at the needs of others. People may be influenced by certain 
pleads for help that are made to raise awareness, but they will be still in charge of 
their own decisions. Being influenced does not mean that someone’s autonomy is in 
danger (Slote, 2007: 61). 
 In the second step concerning care, taking care of, people take responsibility to 
fulfill the needs of others by providing the resources for care. People in need are 
dependent on those resources, in a structural and economic way. In what ways could 
this endanger one’s autonomy? To lack autonomy, that is to lack the moral capacity to 
make one’s own decisions, one should experience the influence of another in such a 
way that one feels impelled ‘to do or think whatever a person or institution tells you to 
do’ (Slote, 2007: 61). Can the giving or receiving of resources result in something like 
this? I think this is very unlikely. The contact between the one who is in need and the 
one who gives resources is not direct. The care taker is not directly confronted with 
the needs of others, so it is relatively easy for the care taker to remain autonomous 
and spend no more resources than he or she wants. The one in need sees the resources 
that are given and is dependent on them. An agency can formulate rules to which 
others should apply as a condition to make use of the resources. Experiencing some 
external influence is not an infringement on autonomy, but the setting of conditions 
seems to be more serious than being just influenced. I think care takers can easily be 
inclined to focus on their own demands concerning the resources they have given than 
on the needs of others that should be met. However, condition setting is often 
executed in the context of care, makes care more effective, and is not bad in itself. 
When the conditions are, however, not focused on the best way to take or give care, 
they tend to have more to do with power abuse than taking care of the needs of others. 
So, when people who give resources are very much involved in the way their 
resources are spent, it is likely that they abuse their powerful position against the ones 
who are dependent on their resources.  
 The step of care giving shows a direct meeting of needs and an accompanying 
dependency in a structural, physical and psychological way. In the practice of care 
giving, the needs of the other are more central than in any other step of care. The 
needs of the other are guiding for the behavior the care giver has, and the care giver 
sets aside his needs. It is possible that the needs of the other become leading to such 
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an extent that the care giver ignores his own needs so rigorously that he is not able to 
make decisions in his own interest (Fine and Glendinning, 2005: 614). In such a 
situation, the autonomy of the care giver is affected. Such a threat to autonomy is 
likely to occur to many care givers. Because care giving is mostly done by family and 
friends, who already have a natural bond with the care receiver, it is more likely that 
they will identify themselves too much with the well-being of the care receiver, than 
someone who has no such bond. The autonomy of the care receiver is also in danger 
in relation to the care giver. In the actual care receiving he is to a great extent 
dependent on the performance of the care giver. Making decisions yourself is quite 
hard in such a dependent situation.  
 
§4.4: Guarding autonomy 
The potential threat to autonomy in the relation of care giver and receiver is a serious 
problem. A threat to autonomy goes along with an inequality of power and possible 
power abuse. I have shown that autonomy in dependent relations was possible by 
interpreting it as decisional autonomy, focusing on being in charge of one’s life. 
However, this decisional autonomy can be threatened when power differences are 
abused. Reflecting on the role of autonomy in the different steps of care, I showed 
that the closer the relation between the two parties involved in care, the bigger the 
chance of power abuse. Power abuse has its origin in power difference and inequality 
of possibilities, but inequalities do not have to result in abuse. In my opinion there is 
one way to diminish the likelihood of power abuse in care relations. Care relations are 
characterized by inequalities in possibilities, but also in power. Therefore, these 
inequalities cannot be diminished prior to any care relation to diminish the possibility 
of power abuse, because when no inequalities exist, no dependency exists, and no care 
relation will be needed. Therefore, it is necessary that inequalities in possibilities and 
power are in such a way used that power abuse becomes less likely.  
I think the best way to diminish power abuse is to look to power in another 
way. Both care giver and care receiver can be in the most powerful position and can 
abuse their power to the other. But when both care giver and receiver regard care as a 
relation and acknowledge that care is both giving and receiving, they may view their 
power in another way. Fine and Glendinning plead for perceiving power in care 
relations as ‘power to’ instead of ‘power over’. ‘Power to’ is focused on 
empowerment and not on domination (2005: 616). Domination suppresses others, but 
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empowerment strengthens others. The power that people have in a care relation 
should be directed at the strengthening of the other. One who receives care has the 
power to impose his will on the one who gives care. Although the care receiver is in 
greater need than the giver, the care receiver should use his power to strengthen both 
himself and the care giver. The care receiver, for instance, can give the care giver 
enough space and possibilities to give good care, instead of commanding and 
directing every detail of care. The care giver on his part should also use his power to 
strengthen both himself and the care receiver, by giving the care receiver enough 
space to indicate his needs and wishes. This attitude resembles the virtues of care, 
which are mentioned in the previous chapter. The virtues of attentiveness, 
responsiveness and respect present in both care giver and receiver make it more likely 
that the interests and autonomy of giver and receiver are safeguarded. Attentiveness is 
centered on the attention that is paid to the needs of others, responsiveness on the 
fulfilling of those needs, and respect is concerned with valuing the other the same as 
you. These three values are directed at the needs of the other, and if both care giver 
and receiver pay attention to these needs, the power difference between two parties is 
not interpreted as the power to dominate the other, but to strengthen the other.  
In this chapter we have dealt with the interplay between autonomy and 
dependency in the context of care. When in the next chapters the duties of citizens and 
the role of the state are discovered and discussed, it is necessary to keep in mind what 
is discussed in this chapter. In exploring the responsibilities and duties citizens have, 
it is important to keep an eye on the extent to which these duties are responsive to the 
mutual dependency as well as to the decisional autonomy of citizens. 
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5. Duties to care 
Now we have focused on the micro level and are made aware of the possible threat to 
autonomy in dependency relations, in this chapter the consequences of these relations 
on citizenship and its duties are examined.  
People have different roles in care relations, which all are defined by mutual 
dependency, but in different ways and for different periods in their lives. The role that 
is central in this thesis is the role of citizen. As citizens, they are dependent on the 
contributions of their fellow citizens to the state system and to civil society. As family 
or friends, they are dependent on the presence and physical care of fellow family 
members and friends. In this chapter the moral consequences of these different forms 
of dependency are discussed. I will argue that it is the duty of citizens to care for each 
other, and that this is based on the special relations citizens have. I will argue that this 
duty to care can be divided into two kinds of duty: a civil and a private one. At the 
end of this chapter several guidelines will be proposed to specify duties to care. 
 
§5.1: From dependency to duty 
To apply the concepts of mutual dependency and care to political theory, we can 
search for the moral consequences and obligations we can ascribe to these concepts. 
Because people will not care for everyone in their reach who is in need 
spontaneously, it is useful to search for a notion of responsibility in the context of 
care, to make sure that needs are fulfilled. In searching for a framework of duties and 
obligations, I categorize care consequentially not as a virtue. I have stated that care 
giving and receiving should be accompanied with virtues to be good care, with a 
smaller chance of power abuse, but this does not mean that care itself should be seen 
as a virtue. Instead, I categorized care primarily as a practice, and sometimes as a 
disposition as well. Care among people is something that should be done sometimes, 
and one of the many things we owe to each other. Therefore, I want to interpret care 
in such a way that somehow the responsibility to care is clear.  
I want to defend that the fact that citizens are mutually dependent justifies a 
duty to care. The first step from dependency to duty is one of the central findings so 
far in this thesis, namely that each person is to some extent dependent on others for 
the meeting of his basic needs. Caring is an important way to answer to this 
dependency. We need each others’ care to eliminate our dependency and make us as 
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autonomous as possible. The core of dependency in care is that we cannot make 
ourselves independent of others and we cannot provide for all our basic needs on our 
own. All people need others, and I believe this is the first step in an account for a duty 
to care.  
 I believe it is appropriate to state that the dependency of others appeals to us 
morally, because we can recognize our own dependency in the dependency of others. 
I do not refer to the idea of empathy as moral guideline Slote is promoting, the idea 
that we should follow our feelings of empathy to define if we should care. A duty to 
care is not based on feelings, but on the fact that the dependency of others could be 
ours. We are involved in the care of others, because the dependency of the other could 
be our dependency, and by caring for others we acknowledge that others need care 
just the same as we need it. By staying aloof, you would give a statement that the lack 
of well-being and the needs of another can and will never be your own. You can, 
however, never be sure whether the misfortune of another will not become your own. 
Therefore, the needs and misfortune of others point us to our own needs. If we would 
not care, we would deny a part of reality of human life: our mutual dependency and 
need of care. Moreover, the fact that you are not in need at this moment, does not 
justify that you are not involved in the needs of others. No one has a choice in the 
extent to which he is dependent. Because no one has influence in the level of 
dependency, in my opinion no one has a right either to more independence or 
autonomy than someone else. No one therefore has a right to a higher level of well-
being that accompanies a higher level of independence. It is therefore just if by the 
care of one with more well-being the well-being of another is raised.  
 
§5.2: Duty to care 
So far I have used the term ‘duty’ to refer to the moral requirement that is attached to 
the mutual dependency of citizens. This word I did not choose without a reason. I 
think it is better to interpret the moral requirement citizens have as duties than as 
obligations, because of an important difference between both concepts. A. John 
Simmons wrote an influential book on moral and political obligations and categorized 
obligations as moral only if they are the result of a voluntary act, while duties do not 
need that requirement (Simmons, 1979: 14). The relations of dependency all people 
find themselves in are not voluntarily chosen and people did not voluntarily choose to 
be each other’s fellow citizens. Especially in the context of care, the involuntariness 
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of relations and positions is important, and to speak of obligations in this context 
would be inappropriate. Simmons categorizes duties as moral only if they are natural 
duties: moral requirements to all as humans, and not dependent on an institutional 
setting like a state (1979: 12-13). Positional duties, duties by virtue of holding a 
position or office, are only moral when voluntarily taken, according to Simmons 
(1979: 12). I do not want to stick to the dichotomy Simmons created for the morality 
of duties: either duties to all, involuntarily and not related to an institution, or duties to 
some, according to your position, but only when voluntarily taken. I believe both can 
go together, and therefore I want to define duties as moral requirements that arise in 
virtue of ethical principles and not of a performance of some voluntary act, and can be 
dependent on an institutional setting (Simmons, 1979: 12, 14; Rawls, 1971: 348; 
Honoré, 1981: 48).  
 A duty to care, then, means that it is an ethical principle that people care for 
each other, regardless of them being family, friends or strangers. The content of the 
duties to care however can differ with regard to the differences in relations and 
positions people have apart from a caring relation. In the next section I will explain 
why. 
 
§5.3: Diversification of duties to care 
The basis of our duties to care is our mutual dependency. I established that caring is a 
duty, because in caring for others we acknowledge that we are vulnerable to the same 
dependency. This is however a far too general statement, which only recognizes the 
interpretation of care as duty in general. Care as a duty can be divided into  a civil and 
a private duty to care. I will explain on which basis this distinction can be made. 
When this is established, I can elaborate on the content of these duties.  
The way I defined duties, as not necessarily dependent on an institutional 
setting, leaves indeterminate if I mean natural or special duties. Natural duties are 
duties that are not determined by the relation two parties have, but by the act itself. 
Natural duties apply to all people, who owe these duties to all other people. 
Independent of earlier actions, promises, or relations, natural duties between parties 
exist (Simmons, 1979: 12-13). Special duties, then, are dependent on the relation 
between the parties involved. Two parties have a certain relation, that other random 
people do not have, and this relation is the justification of a duty (Jeske, 2008: § 3). In 
the context of care in a state and connected to citizenship, duties to care are special 
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duties. When in the next sections the justification and content of duties to care for 
citizens, as citizens and as family or friend, is discussed, the leading thought is that 
these duties are based on the relations these people have. Why especially those 
citizens should care for their fellow citizens, will not be based and justified by the 
intrinsic value of care, but by the relations those citizens have.  
Special obligations are seen as obligations to some specific persons, and not to 
humans in general. The relation between the two parties involved is fundamental for 
the explanation and justification of the obligations that exist (Jeske, 2008: 
Introduction, §3). Special groups have special duties to each other, because of the 
specific relations they have. This thesis places care in the special context of 
citizenship. In this thesis we are not interested in duties to care in general, but in the 
role of care that should be present in the relations citizens have.  
 I want to argue that those special duties to care can be specified in a civil duty 
to care (the care we owe to others as citizens) and a private duty to care (the care we 
owe to others as family or friends). These two categories follow from the description 
of dependency and care relations in the third chapter. Special relations justify special 
duties, and the special and relevant relations that citizens have in the context of care 
are those with citizens in a welfare system and civil society, and those with family or 
friends. In the categorization of Simmons these special duties can be called positional 
duties. Both citizens and family or friends have a duty to fellow members because of 
the position they fulfill. They did not choose to be in such position, but this does not 
remove the morality of this position and the accompanying duty, as I made clear in 
the definition of duties I gave in section 5.2. By this specification of civil and private 
duties, I interpret the relation as a citizen and as a family member or friend as the 
most important in the context of care and as relevant to discuss in the context of state 
intervention and citizenship. Both private and public relations people have in the 
context of care are important for a determination of citizenship and the role of the 
state. Care namely takes place in both private as public relations, and people in a state 
are both citizen and family member or friend. Those different roles cannot be seen as 
completely separate. Not discussing private relations and accompanying duties, for 
example, would therefore not be appropriate, because what happens in the private 
sphere influences the public sphere and the other way around. What happens to you as 
citizen influences your private life, and what happens in your private life influences 
your civil life.  
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 To interpret citizenship as fulfilling your duties to care, as I did in section 2.2, 
is interpreting it as social citizenship. In the next sections, it will become clear that 
this social citizenship is based on political citizenship, which creates civil duties to 
care, and on private relations, which create private duties to care. 
 
§5.4: Civil duty to care 
As citizens, people are dependent on other citizens for their contribution in civil 
society and in the welfare system. This dependency can be characterized by a 
dependency on resources, as I have made clear in section 3.3. In this section, I will 
discuss the justification of citizenship and accompanying duties. In this discussion, 
the relations with state and society are important. Attention will also be paid to a very 
important part of citizenship in the context of care: the responsibility to care for 
others. This has been addressed shortly in the second chapter, but will be discussed 
here more extensively.  
As mentioned in the second chapter, citizens are members of a state and are in 
this way related to their fellow citizens. I will argue that citizenship in this political or 
formal sense has consequences for citizenship in the sense of social responsibility. 
The position of citizenship depends on the existence of a state. Without a state people 
cannot be called citizens. This state creates possibilities in the context of care, which 
cannot be created by another system or person. The state is an independent and 
disinterested party, because it does not have to receive care itself. Besides, it is a 
public and overarching institution, that has the capabilities to create a public and 
overarching system of care services and insurances. The political power of a state 
makes it possible to guarantee care, force or punish its citizens, establish a level of 
minimal guaranteed care and make a division in formal and informal care. Since all 
citizens want to receive care, but are not to the same extent willing to give care, it is 
necessary that an authoritative institution as the state guarantees that other citizens 
will meet your needs when it is necessary. As citizens of a state, each has equal rights 
and receives equal recognition. Caring is characterized by inequality and dependency, 
but as citizens this inequality disappears, because each has equal rights as a member 
of this collective body. To reach this equality the status of citizenship is necessary. 
Only by being a member of a state, by being a citizen, guarantees and equality 
are possible. The relation towards the state and to fellow citizens can therefore be 
seen as a special relation, with accompanied special duties, in which the relation 
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between the parties involved justifies the duties, as explained in the previous section. 
The state guarantees that other citizens will care for you, by giving resources, or by 
giving actual care. To maintain such a system and be guaranteed of such care, it is 
necessary that each citizen will behave as such an ‘other citizen’, and will care for his 
fellow citizens. A civil duty then means taking your social responsibility as a result of 
the benefits of your political citizenship. 
An argument from another perspective, but with the same conclusion, is made 
by Tony Honoré, be it on a structural and legal level and not in the context of care. He 
argues that a citizen can never be independent from a state; no one can deny that he is 
a citizen, and no one can leave society (Honoré, 1981: 46). Citizens are somehow 
related and locked into the same system together, not because they chose to be, but 
because of necessity (1981: 61). Honoré uses the concept of necessity to explain how 
the relation between citizens is: people have needs, and because other people happen 
to be their fellow citizens, they are in a position to help those people in need. He 
compares such a relation with a family relationship, in which family members have 
duties to each other, without having consented to their relationship (1981: 51, 52). 
 Although Honoré’s reasoning does not relate to the context of care explicitly, 
it is useful for the civil duties to care we try to unravel. He states that we have a duty 
to all we share a system with. He relates this to the legal system in general, but I think 
it can be applied to the care system and everything related to care as well. It makes 
clear that we do not only have a duty to our family to care for them, but that we also 
have a relation and an accompanied duty with other citizens.    
The areas in which citizens have to deal with their fellow citizens are the 
welfare system and civil society. In the third chapter we have seen that citizens are 
dependent on the resources of other citizens in the welfare system and in civil society. 
In these areas citizens meet each other, directly or indirectly. The scope of civil duty, 
then, is all fellow citizens, to the extent that they are in a care relation as citizens. This 
means that fellow citizens have a duty to care in the welfare system and in civil 
society, to the extent they are actively involved.  
When a welfare system exists, every citizen of a state inevitably takes part in 
it. I have explained that the contribution of every citizen is needed to maintain such a 
system and guarantee care. The content of civil duty in both the welfare system and 
civil society can be determined by the extent to which other citizens are dependent on 
you. Because our duty to care is based on others’ dependency on us, the extent to 
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which we have this duty is based on the extent to which others are dependent on us. 
Dependency is a matter of degree, so the duty to answer to this dependency, by 
caring, is also a matter of degree. The key to determine this degree is the degree to 
which others are dependent on us. The content of a civil duty in the welfare system 
therefore is determined by the dependency other citizens have on your contributions 
to the welfare system. 
In civil society, the public sphere between state and market, citizens associate 
voluntarily, in for example sport clubs, churches, libraries or community centers. 
Many of these associations are not involved in caring directly. Their reason of 
foundation was not to care for each other. But other associations in civil society are 
founded exactly with that purpose. I want to argue that these associations that exist 
because of fulfilling basic needs of each other and caring for each other, have a role in 
the fulfillment of a civil duty to care.  
In associations that have the primary goal of care and meeting of basic needs, 
relations are created that resemble the kind of relations in which ‘taking care’ takes 
place. Associations like churches, community centers, charities and interest groups 
coordinate care or resources for care, as an addition to direct care that is given by 
family and the general structure of a welfare system. The content of a civil duty in 
civil society is also determined by the extent to which other citizens are dependent on 
your activities in civil society. A civil duty in these associations, then, means a duty to 
take care of citizens who are in contact with these associations, to the extent that they 
are dependent on resources and coordination of these associations. For example, a 
community center has the purpose of social integration and participation of members 
of one neighborhood. When those members need that community center to break 
through their social isolation, this center, or the citizens involved, has a duty to 
provide the services that are necessary for the fulfillment of these needs.  
Nevertheless, such associations are voluntary, and it seems that the existence 
of a duty depends on your own activity in civil society. If you are not actively 
involved in associations that are connected to care, you will not create relations by 
which other may become dependent on you or your association, so you will not have 
any civil duties to care, apart from a duty to contribute to the welfare system. As long 
as a citizen does not have any dependency relations, it is unlikely that others become 
dependent on that citizen, so he will have no civil duty to care. When you are, for 
instance, actively involved in the neighborhood, you will get involved with your 
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neighbors. When they become dependent on you, as a result of your activity in the 
neighborhood, caring for your neighbors will become your civil duty. Or maybe you 
will become friends with your neighbors, and then your duty to care is a private one, 
as we will see in the next section. When none of these relations, civil or private, exist, 
I believe it is fair to state that you do not have a special duty to care for your 
neighbors.  
 
§5.5: Private duty to care 
We have seen that most of the time people are confronted with the immediate needs 
of others in personal and direct relations. People are dependent on the presence of 
others, who accept them as they are and who give care when they need to be cared 
for. Care given by people who are close to you is more efficient and effective than 
when it is given by other people. This can be explained, at least partly, by the virtues 
that should accompany care giving, as the direct meeting of needs. Attentiveness, 
responsiveness, and respect are probably present to a greater extent in relations of 
family of friends than in relations with people who are not related aside from the care 
relation. In families and friendships, people interact with and relate to each other in a 
way, with the virtues of care, which will not be found in other relations to the same 
degree. In no other relations than between family members and friends, unconditional 
attention, care or love is given. People need such unconditional relations, when the 
level of dependency and autonomy is changing, as MacIntyre explained. As 
explained, special duties are based on the special relation people have. These special 
relations within families and friendships are the justification of the private duty to 
care. Only in intimate relations care can and will be accompanied by the virtues of 
care. The content of a private duty to care is, as a civil duty to care, based on the 
degree to which others are dependent on the ones who can give care. People depend 
on the presence and physical care of family or friends, and this should be guiding in 
the content and realization of a private duty to care. 
 It may sound short-sighted to state that all who have a close relation with 
dependent others have a duty to care for them. There are however exceptions, which I 
will discuss in a moment. But beside those exceptions I believe it is fair to state that 
those who are in the best position to provide for the basic needs of others should have 
the responsibility to care. Some people are simply more dependent on us than on 
others, just as we ourselves are more dependent on some than on others. We can 
 35 
recognize ourselves in the need and dependency of others. We can relate to them, and 
this is even more easily done when we know the person in need also apart from those 
needs. Thomas Aquinas argued for the virtue of misericordia, ‘the grief or sorrow 
over someone else’s distress’ and he thought this virtue was easier to achieve when 
there is some pre-existing tie (MacIntyre, 1999: 125).   
However, the care giving can be too demanding for a family member or 
friend. The tasks can be too demanding, because the needs cannot be met by a non-
professional, or are very burdensome for a relative, or the relation between family 
members is disturbed, so the giving and receiving of care is not accepted. Are friends 
and family in such situations released from their duty, or are they allowed to take care 
instead of give care? In the next section I will elaborate on three guidelines that can 
help in determining the boundaries of care. 
 
§5.6: Guidelines for duties to care 
After elaborating on the character of duties to care, several difficulties have become 
apparent. With the diversification in civil and private duties, it is still not clear how 
far-reaching duties to care are, what their boundaries are, and whether a duty to care 
can be assigned. In this section of the chapter I will give a few guidelines for duties to 
care to answer those questions. The guidelines follow directly from the findings in 
this and earlier chapters.  
 The first guideline results from the search for a co-existence of autonomy and 
dependency in the fourth chapter. The inevitable dependency of every citizen can 
leave room for autonomy in care, when we interpret autonomy not as self-sufficiency 
but as the moral capacity to make one’s own decisions. This decisional autonomy is 
most likely to be endangered in personal and direct care relations. When the care for 
someone else would result in such a threat to autonomy that one cannot make one’s 
own decisions anymore, because of too demanding tasks, power abuse or a lack of 
personal freedom, this amount of care is clearly beyond one’s duty. In the context of 
this topic many scholars stress that one should first of all care for oneself, because 
everyone knows how to care for oneself better than anyone else (e.g. Slote, 2007: 62). 
If one does not care for oneself, someone else has to do it, and in this way more need 
for care giving is created. But the autonomy of the care receiver can also be 
endangered, and when this is the case, such care clearly is beyond the duty to give 
care, but also beyond the duty to receive care. A care receiver then can refuse the care 
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that is given to him when it limits his decisional autonomy. Therefore, when the 
autonomy of care giver or receiver is endangered, as a result of the care given or 
received, the task of care giving can be assigned to someone else, or the care given or 
received should be adjusted.  
 This first guideline points to a second one: whether one should care for 
another is not justified by strict reciprocity, emotions or affections, but by the general 
human trait of dependency and grounded on the dependency of others on you. 
MacIntyre argues that justification by strict reciprocity is not needed and not possible, 
because we do not know how much care we received, and most of the times we are 
not able to give care to the ones who gave care to us. We received unconditional care 
and that is what we owe to others (MacIntyre, 1999: 100). A lack of affective 
motivation to care for others is not a reason in itself to abstain from caring for others. 
Such a lack can however be the result of disturbed relations between family members 
or friends. Past experiences with non-caring parents or friends can sometimes be so 
negative that it seems very harsh to demand care for those parents or past friends. Is 
there still a duty to care in those disturbed relations? Remember that the special duty 
to care for family and friends resulted from the personal and direct relations they 
have, which made care giving and receiving in those relations more suitable than in 
other relations. Because of pre-existing ties, family and friends were the best parties 
to be assigned with care giving and receiving. In disturbed relations in families or 
with past friends, those ties have existed, but do not have any meaning anymore. The 
ties that made it plausible that virtues of attentiveness, responsiveness and respect 
were present, do not exist anymore in disturbed relations. Relations with past friends 
or family members who you do not recognize as family are not different from 
relations with other citizens. Therefore, in relations in which family of friendship ties 
do not mean anything, no special private duty to care exists. 
 The third guideline I want to propose is the principle of subsidiarity. It has 
been shown that the direct meeting of needs is done best in personal relations, and 
taking care and caring about can be done in more indirect relations. The principle of 
subsidiarity is closely connected to the vision on state intervention I proposed in the 
second chapter. In the context of care, individuals as citizens have the primary and 
most important role, and therefore care will be arranged first of all at the micro level. 
The duty to care therefore can be guided by the principle that care should be given on 
the lowest level and the smallest scale, where the care givers are closest to the care 
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receivers. When the needs cannot be met on the lowest level, it should be taken over 
by the second lowest level. Care on the family or friend level can be taken over by 
care on the level of civil society. What cannot be done on the level of civil society 
should be coordinated and taken care of by the welfare system, the state, market 
and/or professionals.  
 With these guidelines, some principles by which duties to care should be 
directed are outlined. Are these guidelines however absolute and strict or can duties to 
care be assigned to others without the reasons mentioned in the guidelines? An 
obvious example of transferred duties is the adult child whose parents live in a home 
for the elderly or a nursing home, while their needs are such that care could be given 
by that child. The moral guidelines and principles for duties that have been displayed 
in this chapter are directed at guaranteeing care in the best way. When each citizen 
and family member fulfills his duty to care, caring is guaranteed and is done in a good 
way. Whether duties can be transferred, then depends on whether care is guaranteed 
more and is done in a better way than when they are not transferred. When duties are 
transferred, caring is done on a higher level than strict necessary: instead of, for 
example, private care within a family, care is given at the level of civil society. The 
negative sides of such a transfer are a smaller likelihood that virtues of care are 
present and that care givers feel less responsible. If care by civil society can overcome 
those disadvantages by benefits, it would be morally right to transfer duties. But I 
think in practice benefits hardly ever outweigh the disadvantages of transferred care, 
because the benefits of receiving care from the ones who you love and who love you 
cannot easily be overrated. 
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6. The role of the state in realizing duties 
So far, the general directions for citizenship and its duties are explored and argued for. 
In focusing on the micro level, it became clear that people have dependency relations 
as citizens and as private persons and these relations are the basis for civil and private 
duties to care. The content of these special duties is based on the extent of the 
dependency of citizens and family and friends. The state, in the context of care, thus 
expects from its citizens to fulfill their duties to care, as citizens and as family 
members and friends. This focus on individuals and the expectation from the state to 
individual citizens is based on the vision of state intervention I made clear in the 
second chapter: the state should not primarily be focused on the right to care it should 
secure, but on the duties its citizens have to care for each other. In this chapter I will 
justify more extensively than in the second chapter why this primacy of the micro 
level, citizens and its duties, is appropriate in the context of care. When this is 
clarified, it will be possible to elaborate on what role is left for the state and the 
desired level of state intervention in civil society and the private sphere. In the last 
section of this chapter, I will propose four ways for the state to realize the duties to 
care. 
 
§6.1: Primacy of individual citizens 
What has become clear from the previous chapters is that care has a place in the lives 
of every individual: citizen, family member, and friend. All people are dependent and 
need others to fulfill their basic needs. Everyone is affected by dependency, needs, 
and care. Care is therefore not just a service from the state to its citizens, but 
something that is ‘done’ (given, received, coordinated) by everyone. Care has an 
important place in everyone’s lives, and cannot be reduced to a right that everyone 
has and a service that the state should provide. Care is far more comprehensive than 
that: it is every practice in which the basic needs and well-being of others is central, 
as I explained in section 3.1. The actual meeting of needs can only happen between 
two individuals, and not between two institutions, or between an institution and an 
individual. Therefore, care is primarily the business of individuals. In the context of 
the state, the scope of this thesis, these individuals are classified as citizens. Those 
citizens however are beside citizen also family member and friend, and because also, 
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and precisely, in those contexts care takes place, this classification was not ignored in 
this thesis. 
 The actual meeting of needs can only happen between individuals. This shows 
that it is not at all self-evident that the state intervenes in caring. Such a prominent 
and obvious role is assumed in the model of state intervention in which the right on 
care is emphasized. But this would be a wrong assumption, because the most basic, 
direct, and practical part of caring, the meeting of needs, cannot be fulfilled by the 
state, as institution. The state as institution is not able to care from person to person. 
Of course the state can facilitate, coordinate, stimulate, or force the practice of caring, 
but care giving and receiving has to be left to individuals. Those individuals, citizens 
and family, then, have to reflect on what their part should be in the practice of care. In 
the previous chapters we have seen that, based on the special relations of citizens and 
family members and friends, and the general human trait of dependency, those 
individuals have a duty to care for others, to the extent that others are dependent on 
them.   
 
§6.2: Role of the state 
What, then, is left for the state to do when citizens have the primacy in caring? If the 
special duties of citizenship and family ties are leading for the activities of care, what 
role is left for the state? Is the state then even allowed to intervene in the private 
sphere and civil society? In the second chapter I made a first move in the exploration 
of the role of the state, but in this section I will elaborate more on this subject. In 
section 5.6 it was made clear that duties to care are limited by the possibilities and 
histories of people. A threat to autonomy and disturbed family relations make that 
people cannot fulfill their duties completely. When duties of citizens fall short to meet 
the needs of others completely, the state can use its authority and capacities to add 
what is needed. The role of the state should not primarily be guided by the right 
citizens have to be cared for, but by what citizens did and did not do to their fellow 
citizens.  
 What became clear from the discussion of civil duties in section 5.4, was that 
the special character of the state in the context of care was that it could guarantee that 
every citizen would be cared for. This guaranteeing role of the state underlines that 
the right to care exists, and should not be denied when the focus of the state is on the 
duties citizens have. In this thesis, I assume that such right to care exists for everyone. 
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To guarantee care the state can use different strategies, dependent on the origin of a 
shortage of care. Before I will elaborate on those strategies, it has to made clear why 
the state is allowed to interfere in civil society and in the private sphere. 
 I have made a distinction between civil duties and private duties, based on the 
difference in relations citizens and family and friends have. Civil duties are duties 
owed to other citizens, in a welfare system and in civil society, and private duties are 
duties owed to family and friends in the private sphere. That the state is allowed to 
interfere in civil society is relatively easy to defend: because of the guarantees of care 
the state can give to its citizens, citizens have a duty to cooperate to create such a 
guarantee. As members of the state, which creates benefits in the context of care, 
citizens are active in civil society. Both in a welfare system and in civil society the 
practice of care has a place and is guaranteed. The state, as the party that makes this 
possible, therefore has the right to intervene in civil society and the welfare system. 
That the state is allowed to interfere in the private sphere may be harder to defend. 
Private duties are not based on special relations between the state and family 
members, but between family members or friends among themselves. The state seems 
to have no part in these relations. What right then would the state have to intervene in 
the private sphere?  
 Not without reason I have given attention to both civil duties and private 
duties, in the context of citizenship and expectations the state may have from its 
citizens. Both areas are involved in care and in both areas the state has some role. The 
difference between citizens and family members or friends I made does not mean that 
those are completely separate roles, as already mentioned in section 5.3. A person is 
both citizen and family member, and the role the state has in your life as citizen 
cannot easily be separated from your life as family member, because it affects your 
life as caring family member. The state, for example, decides what should be seen and 
coordinated as formal care and what should be seen as informal care. Such a decision 
influences people both as citizens and as family members. Moreover, the amount of 
care you give as a family member affects what civil society and the state have to add 
to meet the needs of your family. Therefore, the state has the right to ask from people 
to fulfill their duties, both as citizen and as family member or friend. The primacy of 
caring still lays with individuals, but the state is allowed to act as supplement to make 
sure everyone is cared for properly. 
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§6.3: Supplementing civil and private duties  
There are several reasons why civil and private duties to care need a supplement from 
the state. As mentioned in the previous section, the main guideline for the role of the 
state is to assure proper care for all its citizens. Combined with the chosen vision on 
state intervention, it is possible to distinguish three strategies for the state to 
supplement civil and private duties. 
 The first reason why citizens need input from the state is that citizens may not 
be aware of their duties. Just the same as people may not be aware of other’s needs, as 
explained in chapter three, citizens may not be aware that their position as family 
member, friend or citizen creates duties. This may especially be the case when 
previously the state has focused on the rights on care citizens have. Therefore, the 
state can make its citizens aware of their duties by asking them what they are and if 
they want to fulfill them. The first and fourth proposal of the next section connects 
with this strategy. 
 The second reason the state may be needed is that the possibilities and 
capabilities of citizens and family members fall short to fulfill their duties or fall short 
to give all the care the others needs. Inability to provide all the needs of others may 
have many different reasons and may happen a lot. One of the reasons it may be more 
difficult these days to fulfill duties to care than in the past is the development of the 
fragmentation of traditionally close and connected unities (De Boer, 2007: 14, 15). 
People live at greater distances from their family or friends. Is this not a sign that 
caring relations based on family or friendship are not practical in these days? I believe 
however that this is a limited observation. Modern technologies enable families or 
friends to live farther away than ‘next door’ and still be in close contact and of help to 
each other. This also applies to care: not all care has to be done when you are face to 
face (think of keeping in touch with medical professionals) and nowadays distances 
are faster covered than ever before. But these distances nevertheless result in more 
difficulties to care properly than when people live close by. This either results in a 
more likely threat to decisional autonomy, or in the neglect of one’s duty and 
therefore an earlier address to civil society and the state to care. When certain 
distances need to be covered before direct care can be given, care giving is more 
demanding, in time and resources, than when the one in need lives next door. It is 
therefore more likely to happen that care givers become overloaded. People also can 
withdraw beforehand from their assigned task, because they see the heavy duty they 
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have to fulfill. So, more than ideally would be the case, other citizens, as citizens, are 
addressed to step in where families or friends are not meeting the needs of others 
completely, for whatever reasons. Fortunately, the care people receive is not 
completely dependent on the capabilities citizens have by themselves. The state can 
enlarge their capabilities or add to citizens’ capabilities its own. The state can take 
care of the needs of citizens who are not cared for properly. By giving resources, 
coordinating care, command care professionals or otherwise, the state gives citizens 
more capabilities to give care. The state cannot give care directly by itself, but it can 
take care, as the second step in care I distinguished in the third chapter. In this way an 
emphasis on duties to care does not undermine the right to care people still have. If 
care would be completely dependent on the fulfillment of duties and would not be 
guaranteed by a system of laws and rights, the right to care would be in danger 
(Dwyer, 1998: 495). However, a stress on duties of citizens is not a way of shifting 
away responsibility or making care dependent or conditional on the effort of citizens. 
It is instead an attempt to make care for others a norm. When family, friends or fellow 
citizens do not or cannot fulfill those duties, there always should be the certainty that 
the state will interfere (MacIntyre, 1999: 142). Besides, when people have a duty to 
care, this logically corresponds with rights to care (Simmons, 1979: 15). All the duties 
that are assigned to people mean that others have rights to receive care from them. In 
this way, then, it is even plausible to state that an emphasis on duties means that the 
rights to care are emphasized at the same time. Those state resources, however, should 
be contributed by citizens themselves, as a part of their citizenship, as we have seen in 
section 5.4. 
 A third reason citizens may not fulfill their duties is because they do not want 
to do so. A lack of motivation may result in a neglect of one’s duties and a necessary 
role for the state to guarantee that care is still given. In section 3.4 I already discussed 
the subject of motivation and in section 5.6 I mentioned that the fulfillment of duties 
is not based on feelings. A motivation to fulfill civil duties to care, which are mainly 
taking care, as mentioned in section 5.4, can be based on knowing your responsibility, 
instead of feeling it. However, while knowing your responsibility, it may not be very 
easy to fulfill your civil duties. To stimulate citizens to care in civil society the state 
can subsidize certain associations. When many citizens voluntarily contribute to civil 
society, the understanding and involvement of citizens in the compulsory 
contributions to care will increase (Meijs, 2012: 73, 74).  When people are given the 
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possibility to make their own decisions in where and when their resources are 
necessary, people will be more involved in issues of solidarity and neediness. The 
value of solidarity will, according to Meijs, be better understood and therefore a better 
dialogue on the subject of forced solidarity between politicians and citizens can take 
place (2012: 74). 
A motivation to fulfill private duties, however, should be based on the virtues 
of care, as mentioned primarily in section 3.4. Those virtues are indispensible for a 
long-term giving and receiving of care. When someone is commanded to give care 
without the virtues present, this caring relation will not last long. The virtues of care 
may be get caught up by the high demands of both work and care. When a citizen is 
charged with care giving, he is probably not able to work as much as he used to do. 
This means a diminishing of personal income and tax contribution to the government. 
Care can however be expensive, whether arranged by family or by state. When 
citizens are urged to work as much as they can to contribute to society with their 
labor, while at the same time their duty to care is stressed, they likely will become 
overloaded and their motivation to care will be endangered. To strengthen their 
motivation, the state can help its citizens by compensating their care, or periods of 
care increase and work decrease should be incorporated more naturally in work 
contracts (De Boer, 2007: 143-148; Van Doorne-Huiskes et al., 2008: 43, 44, 50). 
This strategy is resembled in the third proposal in the next section. 
All these strategies for the state are characterized by stimulating and 
supporting citizens to fulfill their duties, and not by enforcing them. The state should 
force its citizens as minimal as possible, and instead stimulate them to fulfill their 
duties, to keep the primacy of care with its citizens and their duties. When the state 
would force its citizens to fulfill their duties very often, one can wonder how much of 
the primacy of citizens is left. I believe that in the context of care the state is only 
allowed to force people to fulfill their civil duty of contributing to the welfare system. 
Citizens are inevitably part of a welfare system, when one exists, and their duty is 
based on the guarantee of care the state can and is allowed to give. The content of the 
civil duty in civil society depends on the voluntary contribution of citizens to it, as 
argued in section 5.4. The character of civil society is one of voluntariness, so the 
state is not allowed to force people to be active in civil society. Enforcement in 
private duties to care is also not allowed, because those duties should be accompanied 
by the virtues of care. When those duties are present, no enforcement is needed. Only 
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support or stimulating measures then can make family and friends fulfill their duties 
completely, when they for some reason will not do so.  When those duties are absent, 
enforcement from the state will not create them. The best thing the state can do in 
these situations is stimulate and convince that it is good to care for family members or 
friends.  
       
§6.4: Four proposals to realize duties 
The best role of the state in guaranteeing that the duties to care are fulfilled is a 
stimulating and supportive one. My elaboration on the different duties to care points 
to a division of duties in which the emphasis of caring, the direct meeting of needs, is 
put in the private sphere. So, thinking of implementation of this diversification of 
duties, the emphasis should lay on making the private sphere suitable for the giving 
and receiving of care. I would like to propose four ways to implement these different 
duties to care, which emphasize the implementation of the private duty to care.  
The first proposal focuses on a general internalization of the practice of care in 
society, by a cultivation of a norm to care. In a society in which care is normalized, 
societal arrangements are in such a way realized that mutual care between relatives, 
friends and citizens is possible when needed. Family and friends would benefit from a 
society that has incorporated the fact that all citizens are dependent on each other and 
that care is an answer to this dependency. One step in the direction of a norm to care 
is the weakening of divisions between commercial, public and private spheres 
(Tronto, 1993: 165, 166). Care is first and foremost given and received in the private 
sphere, and should be of importance for what is done in commercial and public 
spheres. The fact that care is a highly private activity does not mean that it should not 
influence other spheres. We have seen that duties to care are especially situated in 
families and among friends, and these duties should influence how civil society and 
business is organized. Another step is to integrate the norm to care in education 
programs. A change in mindset of an entire society may start with the ideas and 
convictions children have and are educated in. When it is taught that dependency and 
care are a normal and integral part of one’s life, it may be more natural to incorporate 
care giving and receiving in one’s life. 
A second proposal is to listen to care givers and receivers, to be aware of and 
attentive to their experiences and problems concerning private care. The care that is 
given by family and friends is called informal care, in contrast with formal care, 
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which is care performed by professionals. Canadian research concludes that where 
formal and informal care co-exist, formal care complements informal care when the 
informal network cannot provide enough care (Chappell and Blandford, 1991: 314). 
Other research shows that in the Netherlands formal care is to a large extent 
dependent on informal care (Van Doorne-Huiskes et al., 2008: 28). From those two 
researches it becomes clear that formal care cannot do without informal care 
networks. Much of care tasks are executed by family and the formal care system only 
can exists when much of the care tasks remain to be executed by family. Furthermore, 
three-quarters of health care in the Netherlands is given by family or friends and 30 
percent of the Dutch population comes into contact with structural family care. Many 
people therefore have experiences with care for family or friends, and undoubtedly 
have ideas of how they can be supported in the best ways. Acknowledging the 
importance of personal and private experiences and developments is in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity. In this way subsidiarity is not some useful guideline how to 
arrange complex systems and roles, but a principle based on human dignity. Human 
capacity is such that humans are ‘fellow architects’ of society (Borgman, 2013: 110). 
By listening to their experiences and ideas, they are seen in their full capacities. 
Especially people who receive care are easily seen as less capable than others, but 
using their experiences shows that this is not true, at least in this context. Listening to 
care givers and receivers can take place in visits to a general practitioner or a social 
worker, or local governments can create platforms in which ideas from care givers 
and receivers are expressed. Those ideas can be taken into account in new local policy 
or initiatives. 
A third proposal is the adaptation of work arrangements to private care. The 
principles of care and work should be made less conflicting to make family and 
friends, but also citizens, willing to fulfill their duties to care. When people are 
willing to care for their loved ones, but are not able, because the burdens are too 
heavy, arrangements should be made to enable people to fulfill their duties. Besides, 
when burdens to care are less heavy, people who at first neglected their duty, can be 
compelled to fulfill their duty. One could think of more flexible work arrangements, 
in which employers work part time for a limited period (Van Doorne-Huiskes et al., 
2008: 43, 44, 50). In this way care giving is easier for both men and women. 
 The fourth proposal I would like to make is based on the idea of family group 
conferencing, and originated in New Zealand (Chandler and Giovannucci, 2004: 218). 
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Guiding for family group conferencing is that the social network of the one in need is 
involved in solving problems and fulfilling needs. In one or a few meetings, the social 
network and the one in need meet and discuss in what ways each can contribute to the 
fulfillment of needs. Both the one in need and the persons in his network then share 
responsibility for solutions. At the end of the group conference, a plan is written that 
outlines the tasks and responsibilities of every person involved (2004: 19). This way 
of discussing problems with family and friends and taking responsibility for solutions 
can be applied to every person who has complex needs and is dependent from others 
to fulfill those needs. 
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7. Conclusion: What do I care? 
The quote of Catherine of Siena at the beginning of this thesis shows a careful 
observation of this Roman-Catholic medieval philosopher and theologian, namely that 
people need each other and have to take care of each other. Whether this situation is 
brought about by divine providence, as she interprets it, or is the grievous result of 
human’s limitations, or exists without particular reason, it is an observation that is 
central in this thesis. In the search for citizenship and the role of the state in the 
context of care, it became clear that citizens should fulfill their duties, which are 
determined by the extent that others are dependent on them. In this conclusion I will 
collect and summarize my findings of relations between citizens, care, dependency 
and the role of the state. This will answer the central question of this thesis.  
In this thesis, I have focused on the relations and duties of citizens in the 
context of care, and not on a macro level, because care is a practice that affects 
everyone and happens primarily between individuals. The role of the state in the 
context of care is therefore determined by the relations citizens have and the duties 
they fulfill. People are dependent on others in different ways, to different extents and 
in different periods, but the situation they all have in common, is their mutual 
dependency in the context of care. Care has different aspects and can be divided in 
caring about, taking care of, giving care and receiving care. Those different steps of 
care take place in the context of dependency relations that differ in closeness and 
directness. Giving and receiving of care has to happen in direct relations. In those 
direct and personal relations, virtues of attentiveness, responsiveness, and respect are 
present to genuinely and directly meet the needs of others. People in such relations are 
dependent on the practical physical care and the presence of each other. Caring about 
and taking care is possible without such close ties, and virtues of care are not 
necessary to provide these forms of care properly. People in relations characterized by 
a caring about are dependent on others’ awareness of their needs. When people take 
care, others primarily are dependent on their resources to care. When people care 
about others, they are aware of the needs of those others, and people in need are 
dependent on this awareness, to be reached by others who can help them.  
 To care for others is an answer to and way to deal with dependency. The 
inevitability of mutual dependency seems to question the possibility to become 
autonomous. The interpretation of autonomy as independency and self-sufficiency is 
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indeed contradicting the feature of dependency. When autonomy is interpreted as a 
more relational concept, and as decisional autonomy, instead of executional 
autonomy, it can still be seen as a goal of care. To acknowledge that people will 
remain dependent makes all parties involved in caring vulnerable. The more parties in 
a caring relation differ in their dependency on the other, the more vulnerable they may 
be to an infringement on autonomy and abuse of power. The more direct care 
relations are, and the more needs are directly met, the more likely it is that the 
autonomy of one of the parties is endangered. It is the responsibility of both care giver 
and receiver to strengthen both parties instead of dominate the other. The virtues of 
care are necessary to accomplish this.  
 People are not able to withdraw from these relations of mutual dependency. 
Everyone is inevitably dependent, and in the dependency of the other we can see our 
own dependency reflected. Because the dependency of others could be our own we 
are involved in each others’ dependency. People did not agree to be dependent on 
each other, and they did not choose to be more dependent on some than on others. 
Therefore, it is right to erase the differences in dependency as much as possible and 
make others more autonomous. The concept of duty reflects the moral responsibility 
people have in situations to which they did not consent. In a state, citizens have the 
moral responsibility to care for others, because they find themselves in relations with 
fellow citizens and family members or friends which create benefits in the context of 
care which outside those relations cannot exist. Citizens have a special relation with 
their fellow citizens, because their political citizenship gives benefits and guarantees 
care, which would not be possible without such a citizenship. The benefits of this 
political citizenship influences the social responsibility citizens have in the welfare 
system and in civil society. This civil duty is characterized by taking care of other 
citizens, by giving resources or coordinate care to the extent that others are dependent 
on you. The relations between family members and friends are also important in the 
context of care. The private duty to care is directed at those personal relations in 
which people are to a great extent dependent on others and needs are directly met. The 
fact that some people are closer and more dependent on us than others creates a 
diversification in the duty to care and gives a special duty to people who we know and 
love. 
Guidelines that can direct the duty to care and draw boundaries are securing 
autonomy for all parties involved, basing care on dependency of others and not on 
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affections, and the principle of subsidiarity. This means that not the mere fact that 
people are family is enough to create a duty to care. It is primarily the closeness and 
the pre-existing ties that make people in the private sphere most dependent on each 
other. Therefore this sphere is most suitable for care giving and receiving. When, 
however, a family relation is disturbed and the virtues of care are not present, the 
special duty to care ceases to exist. 
The role of the state in the context of care should primarily be characterized by 
ensuring that citizens fulfill their duties and supplement its citizens to guarantee that 
care is given to all who need it. To create such guarantee the state is allowed to 
intervene in both civil society and the private sphere by stimulating and supporting its 
citizens. Besides, the state is allowed to force its citizens to contribute to the welfare 
system. Forcing citizens to fulfill their civil duty in civil society and their private duty 
is not allowed. Instead, the state should make its citizens aware of their duties and 
stimulate them to fulfill them.  
To enable especially family and friends, on whom the first and most direct 
duty is laid, to fulfill that duty, several things can be done. The cultivation of a norm 
to care that influences society can help family and friends to incorporate care better in 
their lives. Listening to the actual care giver and receiver for input in public policy, 
and adapting work arrangements to care are other innovations that facilitate a private 
duty to care. On the level of one person who needs care a group conference can be 
held to distribute different duties to care in one social network. 
The research question of this thesis, ‘what should the state expect from 
citizens and what should be the role of the state in the context of care?’ can be 
answered quite clearly. The state should expect from its citizens that they give 
substance to their social citizenship, which is the fulfillment of their duties to care, 
which consist of civil and private duties. Because of the special relations citizens have 
with their fellow citizens, and the special relations family members and friends have 
with each other, citizens have a special, positional, duty to care for others. The content 
of these duties depends on the dependence of others on them, whether they are fellow 
citizens or family members or friends. The role of the state, then, is characterized by 
guaranteeing that the needs of citizens are met, by intervening in civil society and the 
private sphere in a supporting and stimulating way.  
 50 
Bibliography 
Boer, A. de (red.) (2007) Toekomstverkenning Informele Zorg. Den Haag: Sociaal en 
Cultureel Planbureau. 
Boer, de N. and Lans, van der J. (2011) Burgerkracht. De Toekomst van Sociaal Werk 
in Nederland. Den Haag: Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling. 
Borgman, E. (2013) ‘Naar een Jazzy Samenleving: Pleidooi voor de Heruitvinding 
van Subsidiariteit’ in: Christen Democratische Verkenningen 34(1) pp. 108-116. 
Chandler, S.M. and Giovannucci, M. (2004) ‘Family Group Conferences. 
Transforming Traditional Child Welfare Policy and Practice’ in: Family Court Review 
42 (2) pp. 216-231. 
Chappell, N. and Blandford, A. (1991) ‘Informal and Formal Care: Exploring the 
Complementarity’ in: Ageing and Society 11(3) pp. 299-317. 
Christman, J. (2011) ‘Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy’ in: Zalta, E.N. 
(ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2011 Edition. 
Doorne-Huiskes, van J., Manshanden, J.G., Meijs, L.C.P.M., Lupi, T. and 
Dautzenberg, M. (2008) Verkenning Participatie. Arbeid, Vrijwillige Inzet en 
Mantelzorg in Perspectief. Den Haag: Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling. 
Dwyer, P. (1998) ‘Conditional Citizens? Welfare Rights and Responsibilities in the 
Late 1990s’ in: Critical Social Policy 18(57) pp. 493-517. 
Engster, D. (2005) ‘Rethinking Care Theory: The Practice of Caring and the 
Obligation to Care’ in: Hypatia 20(3) pp. 50-74.  
Fine, M. and Glendinning, C. (2004) ‘Dependence, independence or inter- 
dependence? Revisiting the concepts of ‘care’ and ‘dependency’’ in: Ageing and 
Society 25(4) pp. 601-621. 
Honoré, T. (1981) ‘Must We Obey? Necessity as a Ground of Obligation’ in: Virginia 
Law Review 67 pp. 39-61. 
Hortulanus, R.P. (2002) ‘Burgerschap en Sociaal Beleid’ in: Hortulanus, R.P and 
Machielse, J.E.M. (eds.) Modern Burgerschap. Den Haag: Elsevier pp. 7-20.  
Hursthouse, R. (2012) ‘Virtue Ethics’ in: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy Summer 2012 Edition. 
Jeske, D. (2008) ‘Special Obligations’ in: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy Fall 2008 Edition. 
MacIntyre, A. (1999) Dependent Rational Animals. Peru: Carus Publishing Company. 
 51 
Meijs, L. (2012) ‘Red de Solidariteit: Verstevig de Directe Solidariteit tussen 
Mensen’ in: Christen Democratische Verkenningen 33(2) pp. 70-77. 
Plant, R. (1998) ‘Citizenship, Rights, Welfare’ in: Franklin, J. (ed.) Social Policy and 
Social Justice Institute for Public Policy Research pp. 57-72. 
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Simmons, A.J. (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Slote, M. (2007) The Ethics of Care and Empathy. Abingdon: Routledge.  
Tonkens, E., Broeke, van der J. and Hoijtink, M. (2008) Op Zoek Naar Weerkaatst 
Plezier. Den Haag: Nicis Institute.  
Tonkens, E. (2009) ‘Waarom Actief Burgerschap?’ in: Tonkens, E. (ed.) Tussen 
Onderschatten en Overvragen. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SUN pp. 7-22. 
Tronto, J.C. (1993) Moral Boundaries; a Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. 
London: Routledge Publishers. 
Wenar, L. (2011) ‘Rights’ in: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy Fall 2011 Edition. 
